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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) as this matter was poured-
over from the Utah Supreme Court on March 14, 1996. (R. 1585). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is the act or omission of Salt Lake County not to widen 
the shoulder of the road along Wasatch Boulevard a discretionary 
function such that immunity is retained under Utah's Governmental 
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10? 
An appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of 
law no deference but instead reviews conclusions of law for 
correctness. State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) . 
This issue was preserved at (R. 001325-001354). 
2. Does a court have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a 
claim arising out of a discretionary act or omission under Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act? 
An appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of 
law no deference but instead reviews conclusions of law for 
correctness. State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved at (R. 001486-001500) . 
3. Does Keeaan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) 
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represent a change in decisional law requiring relief from 
judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(7)? 
An appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of 
law no deference but instead reviews conclusions of law for 
correctness. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 001325-001354). 
4. Did Salt Lake County waive immunity, assuming immunity 
can be waived, by statements made by counsel at oral argument and 
by not raising the issue again until post-judgment motions? 
An appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of 
law no deference but instead reviews conclusions of law for 
correctness. State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 001406-001426). 
5. Did the trial court err in striking the affidavit of 
Tosh Kano? 
The appropriate standard of review for questions of 
admissibility of evidence is the abuse of discretion standard. 
Salt Lake City v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 001547-001451). 
6. Does Salt Lake County have a duty to widen the shoulder 
of Wasatch Boulevard under the public duty doctrine? 
An appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of 
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law no deference but instead reviews conclusions of law for 
correctness. State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 002368-002369), 
in the alternative this issue should be addressed under the plain 
error exception. See State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
7. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant Salt Lake 
County a mistrial based on the admission of evidence of the 
settlement amount between Hart and Tweedy? 
The appropriate standard of review for the admissibility of 
evidence is the abuse of discretion standard. Salt Lake City v. 
Garcia. 912 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 002335-002338). 
8. Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury 
on the apportionment of fault to the Plaintiff Richard S. Hart? 
An appellate court determines the propriety of jury 
instructions as a question of law, and the trial court's 
instructions are reviewed as a question of law under a correction 
of error standard. Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah Ct. Ap. 
1993) . 
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 001277-001279) . 
9. Did the trial court err in denying Salt Lake County's 
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motion for a new trial based on noncompliance with Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59(c)? 
An appellate court accords the trial court's conclusions of 
law no deference but instead reviews conclusions of law for 
correctness. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 001307-001311). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-8 (1989) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-10 (1989) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-39 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60 
A copy of the above-referenced rules and statutes are 
attached the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a personal injury action arising out of a collision 
between a drunk driver, Robert E. Tweedy ("Tweedy"), and the 
Plaintiff Richard S. Hart ("Hart") which occurred on December 24, 
1986. Robert L. Tweedy is the father of Robert E. Tweedy and 
also the owner of the car driven by Robert E. Tweedy. Salt Lake 
County was later sued under the theory that the road on which 
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Tweedy collided with Hart did not have an adequate escape lane. 
(R. 00088). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On June 8, 1987 Hart filed a complaint in the Third Judicial 
District Court against Robert L. Tweedy and Robert E. Tweedy as 
well as John Does 1 through 10. (R. 00002). On January 19, 1989 
Judge Sawaya allowed Hart to amend his complaint to add 
additional defendants, including Salt Lake County. (R. 00076-
78). On January 23, 1989 Hart filed his amended complaint. (R. 
000079). On February 13, 1989 Salt Lake County filed its answer 
(R. 000102) and raised governmental immunity as a defense. (R. 
000107) . 
On December 13, 1991 Salt Lake County moved for summary 
judgment against Hart on the grounds of governmental immunity and 
causation. (R. 000290-000310). On January 21, 1992 Hart filed a 
memorandum opposing Salt Lake County's motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 000303). Salt Lake County filed a reply 
memorandum on February 3, 1992. (R. 000420). On March 9, 1992 
Judge Sawaya granted Salt Lake County's motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the accident was caused solely by 
the intervening negligence of Robert L. Tweedy. (R. 000488 -
000489). Hart appealed Judge Sawaya's decision to the Utah 
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Supreme Court who poured the appeal over to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. (R. 004 95). The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court and remanded for further proceedings. (R. 000514). 
Judgment was entered against Robert E. Tweedy and Robert L. 
Tweedy was dismissed on March 26, 1992. (R. 000482) . A pretrial 
conference was held on August 23, 1994. (R. 00901). On August 
26, 1994 Salt Lake County submitted proposed jury instructions, 
including a special verdict from which sought to apportion fault 
to Hart. (R. 000967, 001632). The case proceeded to a four day 
jury trial from August 30, 1994 to September 2, 1994. (R. 001056 
- 001141). The jury found Salt Lake County was 51% negligent and 
that Robert E. Tweedy was 49% negligent. (R. 001139-001140) . The 
jury awarded $1,330,000.00 in damages. (R. 001140). 
On September 13, 1994 Salt Lake County filed a motion to 
limit the amount of judgment in accordance with Utah Code 
Annotated Section 63-30-34. (R. 001152). Judge Medley granted 
Salt Lake County's motion to limit the amount of the judgment on 
December 6, 1994. (R. 001207-001208). On January 24, 1995 
Judge Medley entered a Judgment On Verdict In Civil Action. (R. 
001263 - 001265). 
After the entry of the judgment, Salt Lake County filed 
several post-judgment motions and Hart submitted opposing 
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memoranda to each. On February 1, 1994 Salt Lake County filed a 
Motion For Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict, Motion For New 
Trial and Motion For Remittitur. (R. 001267). Hart filed a 
memorandum opposing Salt Lake County's motion as well as a motion 
to strike. Thereafter, Salt Lake County filed a Motion For 
Relief From Judgment Or Order/Or Addendum to J.N.O.V. (R. 
001325). Hart filed a memorandum opposing Salt Lake County's 
Motion. (R. 001303). Salt Lake County filed a reply 
memorandum. (R. 001406) . 
On June 28, 1995 Judge Medley held a hearing on Salt Lake 
County's post-judgment motions. (R. 001433). On September 7, 
1995 Judge Medley entered an order denying all of Salt Lake 
County's post-judgment motions. (R. 001452-001458). On 
September 12, 1995 Hart filed a Motion For Reconsideration To 
Limit Amount of Judgment Under § 63-30-34. (R. 001460 -001462). 
Salt Lake County filed a Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction on September 21, 1995. (R. 001486 -
001487). 
Salt Lake County filed a Notice of Appeal on September 21, 
1995 from Judge Medley's September 7, 1995 Order. (R. 001522 -
001523). On October 5, 1995 Hart filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 
001525 -001526). Hart also moved the trial court to strike the 
7 
affidavit of Tosh Kano. (R. 001528- 001529). On December 4, 1995 
Judge Medley in a signed Minute Entry granted Hart's Motion to 
Strike the Affidavit of Tosh Kano, denied Salt Lake County's 
Motion to Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and 
denied Hart's Motion For Reconsideration. (R. 001571- 001573). 
Salt Lake County filed a second Notice of Appeal on December 
8, 1995 against Judge Medley's December 4, 1995 Order as well as 
Judge Medley's prior orders. (R. 001575 - 001577). On December 
13, 1995 Hart filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal. (R. 001578-
001579) . On March 14, 1996 this case was poured-over to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. (R. 001585). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court or Agency 
Judge Medley entered a final order on December 4, 1995 
denying the remaining post-judgment motions of Hart and Salt Lake 
County with the exception of Hart's motion to strike which was 
granted. (R. 001572-001573). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 24, 1986 Hart at approximately 7:00 p.m. 
accompanied by his passenger Lee Cohen drove northbound on 
Wasatch Boulevard at approximately 5800 South. (R. 000003, 
000081). 
2. Robert E. Tweedy, who at the time of the accident was 
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unlicensed and intoxicated, proceeded southbound on Wasatch 
Boulevard on December 24, 1986 and collided with two oncoming 
vehicles, a VW van and Hart's. (R. 000006, 000035 - 000040, 
000081-000082, 001808-001809). 
3. Hart sued Salt Lake County arguing that the shoulder of 
the road was not wide enough and that had the shoulder been wider 
Hart would have been able to escape the oncoming drunk driver. 
(R. 000087 - 000088) . 
4. Hart's expert, J. Bruce Reading, testified that ASHTO 
guidelines [American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Officials] are treated as the standard of care in 
the design and redesign of streets and highways. (R. 001653). 
5. Mr. Reading further testified that the usable shoulder 
along the site of the accident was nine feet. (R. 001661). 
6. Mr. Reading then testified that the usable shoulder was 
in reality only seven feet because motorists tend to shy away by 
about two feet from fixed objects such as mountain sides. (R. 
001662). 
7. According to Mr. Reading the proper width of the 
shoulder under AASHTO guidelines was ten feet. (R. 001665). 
8. Mr. Reading testified that the road could have been 
repositioned to make a wider shoulder during a prior resurfacing 
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project and indicated that he believed the cost of moving the 
road would be significant. (R. 001668, 001670). 
9. Mr. Reading also testified that under some circumstances 
the standards of the engineering industry could be relaxed, 
including: 
You have got an economic problem, you have 
got a geological problem, there are lots of 
reasons why sometimes you just can't get the 
shoulder width that you need. 
(R. 001694). 
11. Hart testified that he had time between the first 
collision and his collision to move further to the right. (R. 
001814). 
12. Hart testified that prior to the collision between the 
VW van and Hart's vehicle, he pulled to the side of the paved 
road. (R. 001808, 1. 20-25). 
13. After the first collision Hart assessed his options, 
moved to the right, felt like he did not have control of his 
vehicle when the tires went off of the pavement and steered his 
car back onto the pavement. (R. 01809). 
14. Hart testified that the unpaved portion felt unstable 
and he was fearful that if he continued on the unpaved portion 
that his vehicle would run into the mountainside. (R. 001810, 
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1. 1-5). 
15. Hart testified he did not move to the right because 
xx[t]here was nowhere else to go." (R. 001813). 
16. Hart testified that the total medical bills from the 
accident amounted to $74,464.82. (R. 001875). 
17. In his closing statement, counsel for Hart suggested 
the dollar amount of Hart's settlement with Tweedy by suggesting 
that it was inadequate to cover Hart's expenses. (R. 002324-
002325). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Salt Lake County is immune from suit for injuries arising 
out of a defect in the shoulder of Wasatch Boulevard. The act or 
omission as to whether to widen the shoulder of a road which is a 
discretionary function for which immunity is retained under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1). 
Because governmental immunity implicates the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the courts, immunity cannot be waived or 
abandoned except as set forth by the Legislature in the statutory 
waivers of immunity. 
Keeaan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) changed 
the law of governmental immunity justifying relief from judgment 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(7). Prior to 
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Keegan. the application of the discretionary function exception 
to claims brought under U.C.A. § 63-30-8 was conflicting and 
unclear. 
Even if governmental immunity does not implicate subject 
matter jurisdiction, Salt Lake County did not waive immunity by 
manifesting an unequivocal intent to relinquish its claim to 
immunity. Further, immunity was raised prior to entry of final 
judgment due to Salt Lake County's timely filing of post-judgment 
motions. 
Salt Lake County did not have a duty under the public duty 
doctrine to widen the shoulder of the road for Hart. The trial 
court erred in not granting Salt Lake County a new trial based on 
the trial court's failure to instruct the court on the fault of 
the plaintiff Hart. The admission of the amount of settlement 
between Hart and Tweedy prejudiced the rights of Salt Lake County 
and warrants reversal. The trial court's denial of Salt Lake 
County's motion for new trial based on Rule 59(c) was error as no 
affidavit was required. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DECISION WHETHER TO EXPAND THE SHOULDER OF WASATCH 
BOULEVARD IS A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION FOR WHICH SALT LAKE 
COUNTY IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a four-part test to 
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determine whether a particular act or omission is discretionary 
under Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. The test reads as 
follows: 
(1) Does the challenged act, 
omission, or decision necessarily 
involve a basic governmental 
policy, program, or objective? (2) 
Is the questioned act, omission, or 
decision essential to the 
realization or accomplishment of 
that policy, program, or objective 
as opposed to one which would not 
change the course or direction of 
the policy, program or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or 
decision require the exercise of 
basic policy evaluation, judgment, 
and expertise on the part of the 
governmental agency involved? (4) 
Does the governmental agency 
involved possess the requisite, 
constitutional, statutory, or 
lawful authority and duty to do or 
make the challenged act, omission, 
or decision? 
Little v. Utah State Div. Of Family 
Servs, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983). 
In the instant case the act or omission as to whether to 
widen the shoulder of the road near the site of the accident is 
at issue. This decision is similar to the decision at issue in 
Keeaan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) where the State 
did not raise a median barrier along a highway to AASHTO 
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specifications. Applying the four-part Little test, the Keegan 
court concluded that the decision was discretionary. Because the 
similarities between the instant case and Keegan are so striking, 
Salt Lake County will employ the Little test in the context of 
the Keegan decision. 
First, the Court noted that "the decision involved a basic 
governmental objective: to wit, public safety on the roads." Id. 
At 17. Similarly, the decision of whether to widen the shoulder 
of the road equally involves "public safety on the roads.'' Id. 
Second, "the decision was essential to the realization of 
that policy; it involved a determination of not only the degree 
of safety that would be provided by various options considered, 
but also what degree of safety would be an appropriate goal given 
time and cost constraints." Jji. Again, the decision whether to 
widen the shoulder of a road involves virtually identical 
concerns. Salt Lake County submitted in its post-judgment motion 
an affidavit1 from Tosh Kano setting forth the rationale Salt 
Lake County uses in making such decisions. Although the trial 
court granted Hart's motion to strike, Salt Lake County appealed 
1
 Pursuant to Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Salt Lake County 
notes that the affidavit of Tosh Kano was submitted on May 1, 1995 (R. 001350-001353) and 
the trial court granted Hart's motion to strike on December 4,1995 (R. 001571). 
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this ruling and addresses the propriety of striking the affidavit 
in a later section of its brief. 
Mr. Kano noted the safety determinations considered by Salt 
Lake County and its decision not to widen the shoulder of the 
road. Specifically, Mr. Kano notes that a plethora of basic-
policy making factors are considered in deciding whether to widen 
the road at issue. (R. 001351). The factors included are the 
volume of traffic, the number of accidents at the site and cost 
priorities. (R. 001351). Even more telling is the fact that a 
major interstate highway project was in development at the time 
of the accident, 1-215. Mr. Kano testifies that because 1-215 
was about to dramatically reduce traffic on Wasatch Boulevard, no 
major improvements were contemplated. (R. 001351 -001352). 
Even Hart's expert, Mr. Reading, put on evidence which 
establishes the discretionary nature of the decision regarding 
the widening of the shoulder around Wasatch Boulevard. Mr. 
Reading testified that relevant factors used in assessing whether 
to deviate from AASHTO standards include xxan economic problem, 
. . a geologic problem, there are lots of reasons why sometimes 
you just can't get the shoulder width you need." (R. 001694). 
Mr. Reading further testified that he did not think "there would 
be appreciable additional cost" in realigning the road in 
15 
comparison to the resurfacing which was done. (R. 001670). Mr. 
Reading further conceded on cross-examination that the material 
needed to build a road and the economic feasibility of building a 
road were all factors which would justify narrower shoulders than 
set forth by AASHTO. (R. 001680) . Finally, Mr. Reading 
conceded that the AASHTO standards were not mandatory and that a 
ten foot shoulder was not mandatory. (R. 001679). 
In addition, Mr. Kano notes that available options for 
widening the shoulder at issue involves the weighing of costs and 
benefits, considerations of volume of traffic and accident rates. 
(R. 001352-001353). Thus, every available option Hart may point 
to involves the exercise of a discretionary function. 
Third, "the decision involved the basic policy judgment and 
expertise of the agency involved." Jji. The decision on whether 
to expand the shoulder of a road is uniquely within the expertise 
and province of the County, through its public works department. 
Finally, the court concluded that UDOT had authority to make 
the type of decision it made. lei. See also U.C.A. § 63-49-4(1) . 
Similarly, the Salt Lake County Commission has authority pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-22 (1995)2 to make the type of 
Specifically, U.C.A. § 27-12-22(3) (1995) provides that "[c]ounty roads . . . shall be constructed and 
maintained by or under the authority of the county governing bodies of the respective counties from funds made 
available for that purpose." 
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decisions at issue. 
Acts, decisions and omissions similar to the instant case 
have all been characterized as discretionary by the Utah Supreme 
Court. The court has characterized as discretionary the decision 
not to raise a concrete median barrier to AASHTO standards, 
Keeaan v. State of Utah. 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 17-18 (Utah 
1995), the decision to defer improvement of warnings at railroad 
crossings, Duncan v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 842 P.2d 832, 835-36 
(Utah 1992), and that decisions regarding the design, capacity 
and construction of a drainage system to carry away flood waters, 
Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City. 784 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 
1989). 
Conversely, the governmental actions held not to be 
discretionary are distinguishable. For instance in Bigelow v. 
Ingersoll. 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980) suspended on other grounds by 
rule as stated in Workman v. Nagle Construction. Inc.. 802 P.2d 
749 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) an improperly synchronized traffic light 
was found not the result of a discretionary function. Explaining 
Bigelow the Keegan court noted that, "[o]bviously, there was a 
malfunction which was completely unintended and unanticipated and 
did not result from the exercise of anyone's judgment." Keegan. 
259 Utah Adv. Rep. at 836. Similarly, in Irvine v. Salt Lakg 
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County. 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989) the court held that a County 
employee's negligent operation of a backhoe was not 
discretionary. 
Finally, two sister state decisions have held that alleged 
design defects in the shoulder of a road were discretionary 
functions. In Mayse v. Coos County. 583 P.2d 7, 8 (Or. Ct. App. 
1978) the plaintiff was injured when forced onto the shoulder of 
the road by an oncoming vehicle. Plaintiff was injured when he 
"struck a large boulder which projected over the shoulder and 
onto the traveled portion of the road." Id. The court held that 
the county was immune stating that "the essence of plaintiff's 
claim is not a failure of maintenance, but rather that the 
defendants maintained the road as designed instead of changing 
it. The decision to change a design, like the design itself, is 
a discretionary act." Id. At 9 (emphasis added). Mayse is 
particularly relevant because Wasatch Boulevard was inherited by 
Salt Lake County and the essence of Hart's argument is that the 
County did redesign the road to create a wider shoulder. In 
Hughes v. County of Burlington. 240 A.2d 177 (Super. Ct. N.J. 
1968) cert, denied in 242 A.2d 374 (1968) the plaintiff was 
injured due to an insufficiently wide shoulder. The court held 
the state immune from suit noting that "the decision to omit 
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conventional shoulders in building the highway falls within the 
area of nonactionable exercise of governmental discretion." Jd. 
At 179. 
The act or omission whether to widen the shoulder of the 
road at issue was discretionary. The determination of whether to 
widen the shoulder of a major road is not a "routine" or 
"everyday" operational decision. It involves the weighing of 
such policy concerns as cost and safety and it is a discretionary 
function for which Salt Lake County is immune from suit. 
II. SALT LAKE COUNTY CANNOT WAIVE OR ABANDON GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY BECAUSE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ESTABLISHES 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. 
The trial court found that Salt Lake County waived and 
abandoned its claim to governmental immunity based on Salt Lake 
County's: 
(1) abandoning the defense in open court 
during argument on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, (2) failing to raise the 
issue of governmental immunity in any 
subsequent argument, motion or pleading to 
the court, and (3) failing to introduce 
evidence on the issue of the discretionary 
function exception during the trial of the 
case. 
(R. 001456). 
The trial court erred in finding that Salt Lake County 
waived and abandoned immunity because immunity can neither be 
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waived nor abandoned because governmental immunity establishes 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
The application of governmental immunity determines the 
Court's subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be waived by Salt 
Lake County. Although this issue is one of first impression in 
Utah, that governmental immunity implicates subject matter 
jurisdiction is noted by several Federal Circuits. The Fourth 
Circuit recently stated that: 
[w]ith respect to the discretionary function 
exception, while the FTCA [Federal Tort 
Claims Act] is a grant of jurisdiction that 
provides for a limited waiver of sovereign 
immunity, if the discretionary function 
exception applies to limit the waiver of 
sovereign immunity, the jurisdictional grant 
is not available, and the federal court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear the case. 
Williams v. United States. 50 F.3d 299, 304-305 (4th Cir. 
1995). The Court further observed that u[t]he federal courts have 
held consistently that they lack subject matter jurisdiction if 
the discretionary function exception bars the suit." Id.3 
3
 See also F.D.I.C. v. Meyer. 114 S.Ct. 996 (1994) 
(1994)("Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature. Indeed, 
the "terms of [the United States'] consent to be sued in any 
court define the court's jurisdiction to hear the suit."); Fazi 
v. United States, 935 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1991)("If a claim 
falls within this exception [discretionary function exception], 
the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the claim."); Lesoeur 
v. United States, 21 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1994)("federal 
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Furthermore, federal courts have consistently stated that 
the issue of sovereign immunity cannot be waived and may be 
raised at any time during the proceedings. See Westlands Water 
Dist. v. Firebauah Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1993) (wwe 
have noted that sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature. 
An appellate court may consider subject matter jurisdiction, on 
its motion or at the behest of a party, even if it is not raised 
in the district court."); Hydrogen Technology Corp. v. United 
States, 831 F.2d 1155, 1162 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1987) ("It is well-
established law that such jurisdictional defenses cannot be 
waived by the parties and may be raised for the first time on 
appeal or even raised by the court sua sponte.") and Leonhard v. 
courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over tort actions 
based on federal defendant's performance of a discrettionary 
function exception."); Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United 
States, 34 F.3d 968, 972 (10th Cir. 1994)(the application of the 
discretionary function exception "is a threshold jurisdictional 
issue in any case brought under the FTCA") and Attallah v. United 
States, 955 F.2d 776, 783 (1st Cir. 1992)("Because § 2680(a) [the 
discretionary function exception] is a limitation on the waiver 
of sovereign immunity, cases which fall within the discretionary 
function exception must be necessarily dismissed, as a matter of 
law, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.7') . See also Truman 
v. United States. 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1994)(emphasis 
added)(in a case not involving the discretionary function 
exception the court noted that "we must first determine whether 
one of the government's several waivers of sovereign immunity 
applies. If not, the government is immune from suit, and there 
is no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case."). 
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United States. 633 F.2d 599, n. 27 (2d Cir. 1980) ("It is 
immaterial that the defense of sovereign immunity was not 
expressly waived by the agencies below nor pressed by them on 
this appeal. Since sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional 
defect, it can be raised at any time, and indeed by a court of 
appeals on its own motion.") 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "Utah's exception to 
waiver of governmental immunity closely parallel those enumerated 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act. This 
Court has followed the lead of cases interpreting that act." 
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services. 667 P.2d 49, 51 
(Utah 1983). Similarly, this Court should follow the clear 
weight of authority from the federal courts and dismiss Hart's 
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
In addition, a number of state courts4 have held that the 
existence of sovereign or governmental immunity implicates the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the court. See Herzig v. 
Horrigan. 644 A.2d 360, 362 (Conn. App. 1994)("Absent such a 
clear intent, the doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court . . . . " ) . In 
4
 There is conflicting authority among state courts on this issue. See e ^ Davis v. City of 
San Antonio. 752 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1988V 
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City of Lavereane v. Southern Silver. Inc., 872 S.W.2d 687, 690 
(Tenn. App. 1993) rehearing denied by 1994 WL 88930, the court 
stated that: 
the Legislature intended that the sovereign 
be subject to suit only in those instances 
where immunity was specifically removed. In 
the absence of such a removal, the court is 
without jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 
Therefore, the failure to plead governmental 
immunity as an affirmative defense does not 
constitute a waiver of immunity. 
See also Rutherford v. City of Portland. 494 A.2d 673, 675 
(Me. 1985) ("sovereign immunity cannot be waived by imposition of 
procedural requirements or forfeited by procedural defaults . . . 
The City, therefore, did not waive its sovereign immunity 
defense by failing to plead the defense in its answer or at 
trial.") and Moore v. City of St. Petersburg. 281 So.2d 549, 550 
(Fla. App. 1973) cert, denied by 289 So.2d 730 (Fla. 
1973)("Governmental immunity is not an affirmative defense, but 
is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time."). 
Language from these decisions suggests that governmental 
immunity can only be waived by the legislative branch of 
government. See Shanbaum v. United States. 32 F.3d 180, 182 (5th 
Cir. 1994)(emphasis added)("The United States may not be sued 
except to the extent it has consented to such by statute.") and 
23 
Jpngs v. Pitt CQunty Memprjal Hosp., 410 S.E.2d 513, 514 
(N.C.App. 1991)(emphasis added)("It is for the General Assembly 
to determine when and under what circumstances the State may be 
sued . . . . " ) . A deputy county attorney does not have the 
authority to waive immunity beyond that which the Utah 
Legislature has allowed under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The view that Utah's Governmental Immunity Act operates as a 
grant of subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with McCorvey 
v. Utah State Dept. of Transp.. 868 P.2d 41, 47-48 (Utah 1993) 
where the court noted that xx [u] nder our statutory scheme, the 
legislature actually created, rather than abrogated, a limited 
right of recovery against the state for negligent maintenance of 
its roadways." Therefore, at common law Utah courts did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against a 
governmental entity for the negligent maintenance of a roadway. 
Only the Act grants Utah courts jurisdiction to adjudicate such 
claims against governmental entities. 
Utah's notice of claim decisions under the Act support the 
view that the Act constitutes a grant of subject matter 
jurisdiction. For example in Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of 
Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that noncompliance with the notice of claim 
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provisions of the Act deprived the Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. The defendant in Lamarr did not raise the notice 
of claim as an affirmative defense in its answer. Id. Neither 
did the trial court rule on the notice of claim issue during the 
summary judgment proceedings. Instead, the trial court ruled on 
the alternative theory of proximate cause. Id. Nevertheless, 
the Utah Court of Appeals reached the immunity issue on appeal 
and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Id. 
The Court reached the same result in Nielson v. Gurley. 888 
P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) cert, denied at 899 P.2d 1231 
(Utah 1995) where the Court stated that u[t]he failure to comply 
with the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction . . . 
." The Court further observed that "because improper notice 
divests the court of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to 
provide proper notice of claim is a non-waivable defense that any 
party, or the court can raise at any time." Id. Although it is 
unclear, the defendant in Nielson did not appear to raise the 
notice of claim issue until after the defendant lost at trial for 
the first time on appeal. Despite the apparent failure of the 
defendant to raise the issue below, the court dismissed the case 
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Icl. at 136. 
Although governmental immunity has been characterized in a 
different context as an affirmative defense5, whether 
governmental immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction is 
an issue of first impression in Utah. 
None of these decisions address the issue before this Court: 
whether governmental immunity is a non-waivable defense which 
implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court. 
Instead, these cases fashion a rule of construction for the sake 
of analytical clarity. The preference for addressing duty before 
immunity was not based on an analysis of the nature of 
governmental immunity. Further, the rule of construction is not 
universally followed. See Smith v. Weber County School Dist.. 
877 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(1)(b) provides that: "If immunity 
from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is 
granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if 
5
 See Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 152-153 (Utah 1989)("[s]overeign immunity, 
however, is an affirmative defense and conceptually arises subsequent to the question of whether 
there is tort liability in the first instance."); CT. v. Martinez. 845 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1992); 
Smith v. Weber County School Dist.. 877 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and Nelson Bv 
and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake Citv. 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996). But see Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 240 (Utah 1993)(reaching a question not reached by trial court: 
immunity.) 
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the entity were a private person." This language is more 
consistent with establishing subject matter jurisdiction than 
with language creating an waivable defense. 
An analysis of governmental immunity and the decisions from 
federal and state courts addressing this issue show that immunity 
implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts and 
cannot be waived. If the government is immune from suit, no 
court in the State of Utah has subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the claim. Therefore, governmental immunity can be 
raised at any time during the proceedings as other related issues 
of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. 
UA lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any 
time and when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither 
the parties nor the court can do anything to fill the void." 
Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Further, "[a] lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be 
stipulated around nor cured by waiver." id. See also Lamarr v. 
Utah State Dept. of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)("Lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by any 
party or the court."). See also Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 13 93 ("not only is it 
impossible to waive this defense, but also a defect of subject 
27 
matter jurisdiction never can be cured or waived by the consent 
of the parties."). 
There are important policy reasons why immunity in general, 
and why the application of the discretionary function exception 
in particular, should be treated as implicating subject matter 
jurisdiction. As noted in Keegan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618, 
623 (Utah 1995) the discretionary function exception embodies the 
important public policy notion that ''requires . . . [the courts] 
to examine whether a duty of care allegedly breached involves a 
level of discretionary decision making that the legislature has 
determined should not be subject to review by the court system 
but instead regulated by the political process." 
Thus, the recognition of immunity as implicating subject 
matter jurisdiction establishes and maintains important notions 
of separation of power. The Legislature defines how and under 
what circumstances it may be sued. The courts cannot by 
procedural mechanisms create liability where the Legislature has 
specifically indicate there shall be no liability. 
Salt Lake County requests that Hart's judgment be vacated 
and the case be dismissed due to lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because the act or omission of failing to have a 
wide enough shoulder is a discretionary function for which Salt 
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Lake County is immune. 
III. THE CHANGE IN THE LAW OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY RESULTING 
FROM KEEGAN V. STATE OF UTAH IS GROUNDS FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT UNDER U.R.C.P. 60(B)(7). 
Salt Lake County urged the trial court to grant it relief 
from judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(7) 
based on an intervening change in decisional law on the 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 to Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-8. The trial court denied Salt Lake County's motion noting 
that Keeaan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) did not 
represent a change in decisional law. (R. 001457). The trial 
court erred in reasoning that Keeaan v. State of Utah did not 
represent a change in the law. 
By way of brief background, the conflict in the law arose 
between the interplay between two section of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-8, 
prior to its 1991 amendment read: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of 
any highway, road, street, alley, cross-walk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or 
other structures located thereon. 
However, Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-10(1) reads in 
part that: 
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Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by the negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance 
of a discretionary function exception, 
whether or not the discretion is abused . . . 
In Velasquez v. Union Pacific Railroad Company. 469 P.2d 5, 
6-7 (Utah 1970) the Utah Supreme Court found that section -10 did 
apply to an action brought under section -8. The plaintiff in 
Velasquez argued that the highway was defective because there 
were no proper warning devices to warn motorists of a railroad 
crossing. Id. at 6. The Utah Supreme Court reasoned that 
because the decision of whether to put up a safety device as well 
as the type of safety device to put up was discretionary, then 
the government was immune under the discretionary function 
exception, section -10. Id. 
Shortly after Velasquez. the Utah Supreme Court again 
confronted the application of section -10 to section -8 in 
Sanford v. University of Utah. 488 P.2d 741 (Utah 1971). Sanford 
arose out of construction at the University of Utah which altered 
the flow of surface water which in turn caused flooding in 
adjacent property, id. at 741-42. The property owner brought 
suit against the University of Utah and a jury found the 
30 
government liable for damages caused by the flooding. Id. at 
741-42. The defendant raised a number of arguments on appeal, 
one of which was "that the design and construction of the 
drainage system were discretionary functions for which immunity 
was not waived." Id. at 743. In response, the court held6 that 
Since the waiver of immunity in Sees. 8 and 9 
encompasses a much broader field of tort 
liability than merely negligent conduct of 
employees within the scope of their 
employment, the legislature could not have 
intended that Sec. 10, including its 
exceptions, should modify Sees. 8 and 9, even 
though it be conceded that the negligent 
conduct of an employee might be involved in 
an action for injuries caused by the creation 
or maintenance of a dangerous or defective 
condition. 
The issue was not directly addressed again until Taylor v. 
Qgden City School Dist.. 881 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
overruled by Taylor v. Qgden City School Dist., 902 P.2d 1234 
(Utah 1995). In Taylor, the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed 
governmental immunity decisions from Velasquez forward and 
concluded that: 
[w]e are unable to reconcile Velasquez. 
Bigelow. and Leavitt. However, our review of 
6
 While Salt Lake County recognizes that Justice Russon characterized the following 
language as dictum it is important to note that Justice Russon's characterization came after the 
Utah Court of Appeals characterized this language as the holding of Sanford. See Smith v. 
Weber County School District. 877 P.2d 1276, 1280 n. 5. 
31 
these cases leads us to conclude that, under 
the facts of this case, Sanford is the 
clearest pronouncement on the interaction 
between section 63-30-10 and section 63-30-9 
prior to the 1991 amendments, and that 
Sanford has not been definitively overruled 
or limited. 
Taylor. 881 P.2d at 921. 
The Taylor court further noted that the Utah Court of 
Appeals had previously taken the position that 63-10-10 did not 
apply to 63-30-8 in Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.. 749 
P.2d 660, 667 n. 6 (Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 
(Utah 1988). Shortly after Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court 
decided Keegan v. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) which 
overruled Taylor. See Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist.. 902 
P.2d 1234 (Utah 1995)(reversing Taylor v. Ogden City School 
Dist.. 881 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) under Keegan). 
The language in Sanford which states that section 10 does 
not apply to sections 8 and 9 is dictum according to the Keegan 
decision. id. at 622. However, even if the language is dictum, 
the repudiation of dictum represents a change in the law. In 
State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994)(emphasis added) the 
Court stated that " [v]ertical stare decisis . . . compels a court 
to follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court. 
Under this mandate, lower courts are obliged to follow the 
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holding of a higher court, as well as any "judicial dicta" that 
may be announced by the higher court." 
Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals and the District Courts of 
the State of Utah were all obliged to follow Sanford, including 
dictum contained in Sanford. Therefore, by overruling dictum in 
Sanford the Utah Supreme Court changed the law of governmental 
immunity. 
The holding of Keegan is directly contrary to the dictum in 
Sanford and represents a change in decisional law. The next step 
in the analysis is to show whether such a change in decisional 
law constitutes a sufficient basis for granting relief under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(7). This is an issue of first 
impression in Utah. However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has addressed the effect of intervening change in decisional law 
on a judgment. The last Tenth Circuit case addressing this issue 
is Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce. Fenner & Smith. 39 F.3d 1482, 
1491 n. 6 (10th Cir. 1994) where the Court stated that u[i]n this 
circuit, a change in relevant case law by the United States 
Supreme Court warrants relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (6)7." 
7
 Although there is conflicting statements within the Tenth Circuit on this issue Metz is 
the last case to address this issue. Cf Colorado Interstate Gas v. Natural Gas Pipeline. 962 F.2d 
1528 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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Other courts require a showing of extraordinary circumstances8. 
See Watson v. Symons Corp.. 121 F.R.D. 351, 357 (N.D.I11. 
1988)("where substantial justice requires Rule 60(b) relief, and 
unique circumstances demonstrate that the moving party has not 
used the rule as a substitute for appeal, an earlier failure to 
appeal does not prevent the court from reaching a just result.") 
and Brown v. Clark Equipment Company, 96 F.R.D. 166, 168 (D. 
Maine 1982)("These cases establish that relief from final 
judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) requires a showing of extraordinary 
circumstances,7 on the basis of a judicial balancing for finality 
and the need to do justice."). 
Salt Lake County submits that the confused, if not 
conflicting, language of Velasquez and Sanford. combined with 
Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist., 881 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) overruled by Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist.. 902 P.2d 
1234 (Utah 1995) resolving the application of section 10 to 
section 8, followed by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Keegan v. State resolving the issue in an opposite manner 
presents an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief from 
8There is conflicting authority on the issue of whether a change in the law constitutes a 
sufficient basis to grant relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). See Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2684. 
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judgment under Rule 60(b)(7). Such a confused course of 
decisions does not occur often in Utah law. 
In addition, comparing the policy favoring finality with the 
policy favoring justice in this case, Salt Lake County should be 
relieved from the judgment. Principles of finality are minimal. 
Salt Lake County moved for relief from judgment prior to entry of 
final judgment, albeit after the jury verdict. Salt Lake County 
was not attempting to side-step the appeals process. Finally, 
Salt Lake County moved for relief under U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7) within 
a reasonable time after the issuance of Keegan. 
Case law from other jurisdictions have granted relief from 
judgment under less compelling circumstances. In Koch v. Billings 
School Dist. No. 2. 833 P.2d 181, 183 (Mont. 1992) a plaintiff 
moved for relief from judgment over one year after entry of final 
judgment in the trial court under Rule 60(b)(6) based on an 
intervening change in case law. The Montana Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court's denial of the motion based on 
exceptional circumstances, which included that fact that the law 
was unclear and potentially misleading prior to the change in 
case law. In Overbee v. Van Waters & Rogers, 765 F.2d 578 (6th 
Cir. 1985) the Court granted relief from judgment under Rule 
60(b)(6) under the following extraordinary circumstances: "[t]he 
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action of the Ohio Supreme Court in reversing itself within one 
year is certainly an unusual occurrence." Id. at 580. 
Similarly in this case, Utah's resolution of the application 
of section 10 to section 8 was confused. In fact, the law was so 
confused the Utah Court of Appeals took one position and was 
within a year reversed by the Utah Supreme Court in another 
decision. This change in case law strongly compels granting 
relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) either by itself or under a 
compelling circumstances test. 
Salt Lake County asks that the trial court's judgment 
finding no change in law be reversed and that the judgment 
against Salt Lake County be vacated based on the intervening 
change in law. In the alternative, Salt Lake County requests 
that the case be remanded for additional hearings on the 
application of the discretionary function exception. 
IV. EVEN IF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY CAN BE WAIVED OTHER THAN BY 
STATUTE, IT WAS NOT WAIVED BECAUSE NO UNEQUIVOCAL INTENTION 
TO ABANDON THE CLAIM WAS EXPRESSED. 
The trial court found that Salt Lake County waived or 
abandoned its claim to governmental immunity in part because of 
statements made by counsel for Salt Lake County. Counsel for 
Salt Lake County made the following statements at the hearing 
considering Salt Lake County's motion for summary judgment: 
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THE COURT: Mr. McKnight, are you abandoning 
the immunity argument? 
MR. MCKNIGHT: I believe so. I kind of 
inherited this case. I am not sure what my 
previous counsel was thinking, so I will not 
pursue it now. 
(R. 001400-001401). 
The above statement does not meet the legal requirements for 
waiver and abandonment. Abandonment is defined as "the 
intentional, unequivocal relinquishment of a benefit due from 
another." Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). Waiver is also defined as "the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right." Barnes v. Wood. 750 P.2d 1226, 
1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). However, the court cautioned that 
u[t]he party's actions or conduct must evince unequivocally an 
intent to waive, or must be inconsistent with any other intent." 
Id. In Bailey v. Sound Lab. Inc.. 694 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1984) 
the court noted that the abandonment of a motion must be 
intentional. 
The language relied on by the trial court suggests no 
unequivocal intent to waive governmental immunity. Particularly 
the statement, "I am not sure what my previous counsel was 
thinking, so I will not pursue it now," expresses an intention 
not to pursue the argument at the time of the oral argument. The 
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statement is equivocal and tentative and cannot properly form the 
basis of a finding of waiver or abandonment. As a matter of law, 
an equivocal statement cannot constitute a waiver or abandonment. 
Further, the failure to raise immunity before and during 
trial similarly does not constitute a waiver. When Salt Lake 
County again raised immunity in its post-judgment motion, the 
judgment was not yet final. Salt Lake County filed timely post-
judgment motions which delayed the finality of the judgment. 
Therefore, the issue was properly and timely raised before the 
trial court. In addition, the failure to raise the issue at 
trial should not constitute a waiver. Although Salt Lake County 
could have been more diligent in raising the issue, the state of 
the law was confused and in conflict as Taylor v. Ogden City 
School Dist.. 881 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) overruled by 
Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist.. 902 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1995) 
indicates. When Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 896 (Utah 1995) was 
decided, the County acted promptly and submitted a motion 
requesting relief from judgment under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(7). 
Therefore, even if this Court finds that immunity is a 
waivable defense, Salt Lake County did not waive or abandon the 
defense in the case at bar. The defense was raised in Salt Lake 
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County's answer and in its motion for summary judgment. Although 
counsel for Salt Lake County may have appeared to abandon the 
argument, the transcript of the proceeding clearly shows 
counsel's response was equivocal and did not evince an intent to 
permanently relinquish Salt Lake County's right to assert 
immunity. Finally, the County expeditiously raised immunity 
after the release of Keeaan v. State of Utah, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1995) before the judgment in the trial court was final. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE UNTIMELY MOTION TO 
STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF TOSH KANO WHICH WAS RELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
The trial court granted Hart's motion to strike the 
affidavit of Tosh Kano which specified the discretionary nature 
of the act or omission in widening Wasatch Boulevard, 
The affidavit was submitted with Salt Lake County's Motion 
For Relief From Judgment pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(7) on April 28, 1995. Not until October 6, 1995 did Hart 
move to strike the affidavit of Tosh Kano, nearly five and one-
half months after the affidavit was filed. 
Hart waived any objection he may have had to the affidavit 
by his untimely delay in objecting to the affidavit. In light of 
this extensive delay, the trial court erred in granting the 
motion to strike. See D & L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420, 421 
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(Utah 1989) (noting that party waived any objections to affidavit 
submitted with Rule 56 motion by failing to object). The same 
rule logically applies to an affidavit submitted in support of 
Salt Lake County's Rule 60(b) motion. By failing to object in a 
timely fashion, Hart waived any objection to the affidavit's 
admissibility. 
Further, the substantive ground for striking the affidavit 
were in error and constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court. The affidavit addresses factors relevant to the issue of 
governmental immunity which is relevant to the liability of Salt 
Lake County as previously set forth in this brief. 
VI. SALT LAKE COUNTY OWED NO DUTY TO HART TO WIDEN THE SHOULDER 
OF THE ROAD. 
Salt Lake County was found liable because the shoulder at 
the side of Wasatch Boulevard did not meet AASHTO specifications. 
However, Salt Lake County owed no duty to Hart to widen the 
shoulder of the road. Salt Lake County objected to Jury 
Instruction #23 on the grounds that there was no evidence of 
negligence in failing to have an adequate escape lane. (R. 
002288) . Further, Salt Lake County raised the specific issue of 
public duty at oral argument without objection on June 28, 1995. 
(R. 002368-002369). If the Court finds this insufficient to 
40 
preserve the issue, Salt Lake County urges consideration under 
the plain error exception. See State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
"The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question 
of law to be decided by the court." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 
149, 151 (Utah 1989). Where a governmental entity is sued, the 
public duty doctrine is implicated. The doctrine has been stated 
as follows: 
For a governmental agency and its agents to 
be liable for negligently caused injury 
suffered by a member of the public, the 
plaintiff must show a breach of duty owed him 
as an individual, not merely the breach of an 
obligation owed to the general public at 
large by the government official. 
Another characterization of the doctrine is that "a duty to 
all is a duty to none." Rollins v. Petersen. 813 P.2d 1156, 1165 
(Utah 1991)(Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Hart has not shown, and cannot show that Salt Lake County 
owed any particular duty to Hart consistent with the public duty 
doctrine. 
For example in Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transp.. 82 8 
P.2d 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) this Court found that Salt Lake 
City owed no duty to a pedestrian traveling on an overpass to 
"control" the transient population below. The Court reasoned 
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that the plaintiff "failed to establish that the City owed him 
any duty of care beyond that owed to the general public. There 
is no evidence in the record that the City had any reason to 
distinguish Lamarr from the general public." Id. at 540. 
Similarly in the instant case, Hart did not present evidence 
that Salt Lake County was aware of Hart or was required to 
undertake any special precautions to insure Hart's safety. Hart 
has not differentiated himself from the general traveling public 
which utilized Wasatch Boulevard. Therefore, Hart cannot overcome 
the requirements of the public duty doctrine. See also 
Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake City, 371 P.2d 211 (Utah 
1962)(governmental entity has no general duty to fence in 
waterways). 
Although Trapp v. Salt Lake City Corp., 835 P.2d 161 (Utah 
1992) purported to limit application of the public duty doctrine 
to instances where "people, not physical facilities, are the 
things that must be "controlled'" Trapp can be distinguished on 
the grounds that Hart's claim goes not to the failure to maintain 
Wasatch Boulevard but rather to the failure to redesign Wasatch 
Boulevard to provide for a wider shoulder. This distinction is 
important because it goes to the ability of the governmental 
agency to foresee and manage its risks. The duty to redesign a 
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road to avoid the tragedy caused by a drunk driver is beyond the 
scope of the public duty doctrine. As a matter of law, Salt Lake 
County owed no duty to Hart to build a shoulder to Wasatch 
Boulevard that meets AASHTO specifications. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING SALT LAKE COUNTY'S MOTION 
FOR MISTRIAL BASED ON THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ON THE 
AMOUNT OF SETTLEMENT. 
In considering the improper admission of evidence on appeal, 
an appellate court "may not interfere with a jury verdict unless 
upon review of the entire record, there emerges error of 
sufficient gravity to indicate that a defendant's rights were 
prejudiced in a substantial manner." State v. Salmon. 612 P.2d 
366, 370 (Utah 1980) . Further, an appellate court must find that 
absent the error, ua reasonable probability there would have been 
a different result." Id. 
At closing argument, Hart's counsel made the following 
statement: 
You have heard some instructions from the 
court about settlement. Mr. Tweedy is not in 
this courtroom. The court has instructed you 
why. He settled his case early on with the 
plaintiff. You are not permitted in the 
evidence to learn the details of that 
settlement, but you did hear testimony of the 
amount of Mr. Tweedy's injuries, his 
expenses. You heard testimony from his 
father that the settlement did not even 
address those. Mr. Tweedy is not here and 
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you are required to determine what degree of 
negligence each party should bear. 
(R. 002324-002325). 
Hart testified that the total medical bills from the 
accident amounted to $74,464.82. (R. 001875). Therefore, 
counsel for Hart was able to improperly inform the jury of the 
amount of the settlement. Salt Lake County moved for a mistrial 
on these grounds, which was denied by the trial court. (R. 
002335-002337). 
Jury Instruction #9 (R. 001087) concerns the settlement of 
Robert E. Tweedy and Robert L. Tweedy and does not address the 
issue of settlement amount. The disclosure of the settlement 
amount advised the jury that the settlement with Hart was not 
adequate to compensate Hart for his medical expenses and invited 
the jury to award an excessive amount of damages. The disclosure 
of the amount of settlement invited the jury to proportion fault 
and assess damages not with respect to the evidence, but instead 
to compensate for a perceived inadequate settlement. 
In King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988) the defendant in 
a personal injury action brought out the fact that the plaintiff 
had settled a prior personal injury case. The plaintiff was not 
allowed on re-direct to elicit evidence as to the amount of 
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settlement. The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the 
issue of damages noting that the plaintiff "was entitled to make 
a full disclosure on that subject to rehabilitate herself and to 
dispel any inference that a verdict for her would result in 
double recovery." id. at 980. Conversely, in the instant case 
Salt Lake County did not attempt to show double recovery. Here, 
Hart improperly invited the jury to compensate him for inadequate 
settlement which is improper. The admission of the settlement 
amount was prejudicial and encouraged the jury to award excessive 
damage. Salt Lake County's rights were prejudiced in a 
substantial manner as is evidenced by the excessive verdict in 
this case. 
VIII. THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON 
COMPARATIVE FAULT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-39(1) provides: 
[t]he trial court may, and when requested by 
any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to 
find special verdicts determining the total 
amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage and proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeking recovery, 
to each defendant, and to any person immune 
from suit who contributed to the alleged 
injury. 
The trial court failed to submit Salt Lake County's special 
verdict form which sought to apportion fault to Hart. Salt Lake 
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County submitted a special verdict form which called for the jury 
to apportion fault to the Plaintiff Richard S. Hart. (R. 
001632). Counsel for Salt Lake County submitted an affidavit9 
which stated: "In conference in chambers with the Court defendant 
Salt Lake County Commission requested that the plaintiff be 
included on the final special verdict form submitted to the jury 
in order to allow the jury to consider the plaintiff's negligence 
in apportioning fault." (R. 001304). No contrary affidavit was 
ever submitted10. 
The trial court gave a jury instruction which did not allow 
the jury to apportion fault to Hart, despite the fact that there 
was abundant evidence upon which the jury could have found some 
degree of comparative fault. Furthermore, Salt Lake County 
objected to Jury Instruction # 26 (R. 00002288) which contained 
9
 Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(e) it is noted that Hart moved to strike 
the affidavit of Mr. Postma. (R. 001317). Judge Medley did not rule on Hart's motion to strike. 
(R. 001452-001459). The trial court did deny Salt Lake County's motion for a new trial on 
procedural grounds due to failure to file a timely affidavit pursuant Rule 59. (R. 001456). 
10
 The trial court stated in part: " . . . it is obvious to me that Mr. Postma has a better 
recollection of discussions we had off the record than I do regarding this Special Verdict Form 
issue.. . . I probably should not have had that discussion off the record. I am not sure Mr. 
Postma's recitation is accurate at this point, but I do know for sure that I did not include the 
plaintiff on the Special Verdict Form because I didn't think that there was any evidence 
establishing ~ any evidence establishing that the plaintiff was negligent." (R. 002371). Mr. 
Postma submitted a sworn affidavit as to his recollection which is corroborated by Salt Lake 
County's special verdict form which included the plaintiff for fault apportionment purposes. 
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the following: "the presence of such an emergency or sudden peril 
does not constitute such an excuse or justification for 
negligence if the emergency or sudden peril was caused by that 
person's own fault." (R. 001104). This language can only be 
taken to refer to Hart's potential negligence. Having so 
instructed the jury it is contradictory for the trial court not 
to at least allow the jury the opportunity to apportion some 
fault to Hart. 
Evidence of comparative fault includes: 
(1) Prior to the collision between the VW van and Hart's 
vehicle, Hart pulled to the side of the paved road. (R. 001808, 
1. 20-25) ; 
(2) After the collision of the VW van and prior to the 
collision with Hart, Hart testified as follows: 
I saw the van swerve just prior to the moment 
of impact and I saw it begin to tip over, and 
at that time I assessed all of my options 
since I could see the mountainside and I 
could see the edge of the pavement, but I 
couldn't see clearly what was between the 
edge of the pavement and the mountainside. I 
considered the possibility of going left, 
considered the possibility of going right. 
Went further to the right. My tires went off 
the pavement and at that point I didn't feel 
like I had control of the vehicle, and I 
steered back left and in a direction towards 
the center line but just enough to bring my 
tires back on the pavement. 
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(R. 001809). 
(3) Hart further testified that he did not go further or 
remain on the paved portion of the road because: 
[t]he unpaved portion felt very unstable. I 
didn't feel like I had control over the 
vehicle and I was afraid, but if I continued 
traveling in that unpaved portion that the 
vehicle would be pulled over and ran into 
this mountainside. 
(R. 001810, 1. 1-5). 
(4) Hart also testified that the shoulder "dropped off 
sharply as compared with the pavement. The vehicle began to lean 
over the mountainside." (R. 001810, 1. 9-11). 
(5) Hart steered his car back onto the pavement so that all 
four tires were on the pavement. (R. 001811). 
(6) Hart testified that in between the collision with the VW 
van and the time the drunk driver hit him, he had time to move to 
the right. (R. 001813-001814). 
Salt Lake County submits that the above testimony provides a 
basis upon which a jury could infer that Mr. Hart was at least 
somewhat at fault for not moving onto the shoulder of the road to 
avoid the oncoming drunk driver despite his perception that the 
shoulder was not off sufficient width and grade to accommodate 
his vehicle. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39(1) states that the trial court 
"shall" direct the jury to determine the "proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeking recovery . . . ." The 
submission of a special verdict which sought to apportion fault 
to Hart implicated section 78-27-39 and compelled the trial court 
to give the instruction to the jury. The failure to give such a 
special verdict is reversible error. 
The trial court's finding that counsel for Salt Lake County 
would not seek to apportion fault to Hart is without support in 
the record. (R. 001454). The trial court, by its own admission, 
stated it could not recall the events to which Mr. Postma 
attested. See note 8 infra. Conversely, Mr. Postma submitted a 
sworn affidavit which is corroborated by Salt Lake County's 
special verdict form. (R. 001632). The trial court's factual 
determination was without any evidentiary support and its legal 
conclusion erroneous. 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF SALT LAKE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH UTAH RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 59(C) WAS ERROR. 
The trial court denied Salt Lake County's motion for new 
trial due to the alleged failure to comply with Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59(c). (R. 001456). However, Salt Lake County's 
motion for a new trial based on the trial court's failure to 
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properly instruct on the issue of comparative fault is properly 
characterized as Rule 59(7) motion and not a Rule 59(1) motion 
making Rule 59(c)'s requirement of an affidavit unnecessary. Even 
if Salt Lake County's motion should have been brought under Rule 
59(a) (1) an affidavit was unnecessary as all the relevant facts 
were contained in the record. Further, the trial court reached 
the issue of apportionment of fault (R. 001454) in its fact 
determinations. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Salt Lake County asks this 
Court to vacate the judgment below and dismiss Hart's claims with 
prejudice or in the alternative to remand the case for an 
evidentiary hearing on whether the discretionary function 
exception applies to retain immunity for Salt Lake County. 
DATED this J>*^ day of ^/wj^/^y /L 1996. 
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collected through attachment proceeding, of an attorney against the proceeds of the judg-
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805 (1906). ment does not include his personal right to exe-
Vacation of satisfaction. cute against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V. 
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed Fed. Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187 
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated with- (Utah 1974). 
out action and hearing in equity, and the lien 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 1004 et seq. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 891 to 899. 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 69, F.R.C.P.
 0f verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Harmless error not Rule 606. 
ground for new trial, Rule 61. 
Tab 2 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., made in due time, 69 A.L.R3d 845. 
115, 116, 122 to 127. Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating civil case where jury has been waived or not 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
 appeal, 38 A.L.R4th 1170. 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set- j ^ y ^ ^ Q
 waiVer as Lnding on later state 
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
 c i v i j ^ ^ 4g A.L.R.4th 747. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
 C o u r t ^porter's death or disability prior to 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil trangcnbing notes as grounds for reversal or 
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
 n e w trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.LK3d 335 Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
 n e w ^ ^ Qn d o f ^ ^ 
tions in civil case as affected by the manner m
 c , ° , MmMt c A T o e+i, 
which they are written, 10 A L.R3d 501. J g f * o f d a m a 8 e e ~ m o d e r n c a f l e 8 ' 6 A L R 5 t h 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 87*J* ,
 r , 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
 J Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. d a m a * e 8 f o r P*™>™] "WW to or death of sea-
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference man in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
A.L.R.3d 1101. Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial ages for personal injury or death in actions un-
of civil case, 25 AJL.R.3d 637. der Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of §§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 169. 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor- Key Numbers. — New Trial •=» 13 et seq., 
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 n o , 116. 
A.LJl.3d 126. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Hule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
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obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Any o t h e r TeaBOn Justifying relief." 
^Default judgment. 
.-Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after dismissal. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—.Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 
Effect of set-aside judgment. 
-Admissions. 
Form of motion. 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Divorce action. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect 
—Default judgment. 
Illness. 
Inconvenience. 
-—Meritorious. 
Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney. 
« No claim for relief. 
—Delayed motion for new trial. 
—Factual error. 
—Failure to file cost bill. 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
—Trial court's discretion. 
"-Unemployment compensation appeal. 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Discretion not abused. 
Procedure. 
---Notice to parties. 
Kes judicata. 
Reversal of judgment. 
—Invalidation of sale. 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand. 
—Erroneously included damages. 
—Prospective application of judgment. 
Timeliness of motion. 
—Confused mental condition of party. 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
—Fraud. 
—Invalid service. 
—Judicial error. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect. 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption. 
—"Reasonable time." 
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion. 
—Satisfaction. 
Unauthorized appearance. 
Void judgment. 
—Basis. 
—Lack of jurisdiction. 
Cited. 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
Subdivision (7) embodies three require-
ments: First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); sec-
ond, that the reason justify relief; and third, 
that the motion be made within a reasonable 
time. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Where a defendant's motion to set aside 
judgment based on Subdivisions (b)(1) and (7) 
and his motion for a new trial claimed that 
plaintiff violated Rule 5(a) on several occasions 
by not providing defendant with a copy of 
pleadings, thereby causing surprise, centering 
on plaintiffs failure to provide a copy of his 
motion for summary judgment to defendant, 
which the latter claimed was a clear showing 
of fraud on plaintiffs part, the trial court could 
have believed in denying defendant's motion, 
that fraud was not present in what could be 
considered a lapse in procedure by plaintiffs 
counsel. Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Defendant's claim that he mistakenly en-
tered into an ill-advised stipulation without 
fully understanding its consequences was cor-
rectly characterized by trial court as mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or neglect under Subdi-
vision (b)(1); because Subdivision (b)(1) ap-
plied, Subdivision (b)(7) could not apply and 
could not be used to circumvent the three-
month filing period. Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
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JUDICIAL CODE 78-27-41 
w ; **- given by the injured person need not take a particular 
f S j l and is sufficient if it indicates by any form of written 
irassion t h e intention o f t n e injured person not to be bound 
*^?the settlement agreement, liability release, or disavowed 
d e m e n t 
1}g.27-36. Right of rescission or disavowal of release, 
•;" settlement, or statement by injured person in 
addition to other provisions. 
The rights provided by this act are intended to be in addition 
• ^ not in lieu of, any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, 
'provisions otherwise existing in the law. 1973 
flg-27-37. Definitions [Effective unti l Ju ly 1,1997]. 
Afi u s e d ^ Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person 
immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3), who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking 
recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, 
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to 
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, 
including negligence in all its degrees, contributory neg-
ligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of 
express or implied warranty of a product, products liabil-
ity, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person immune from suit" means: 
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 35, 
Chapter 1 or 2; and 
(b) a governmental entity or governmental em-
ployee immune from suit pursuant to Title 63, Chap-
ter 30, Governmental Immunity Act. 
(4) "Person seeking recovery*' means any person seek-
ing damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on 
behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal 
representative. 1994 
Definitions [Effective Ju ly 1,1997]. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person 
immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3), who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking 
recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, 
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to 
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, 
including negligence in all its degrees, contributory neg-
ligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of 
express or implied warranty of a product, products liabil-
ity, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person immune from suit" means: 
(a) an employer immime from suit under Title 
35A, Chapter 3, Workers' Compensation Act, or Chap-
ter 3a, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and 
(b) a governmental entity or governmental em-
ployee immune from suit pursuant to Title 63, Chap-
ter 30, Governmental Immunity Act. 
(4) "Ferson seeking recovery" means any person seek-
ing damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on 
behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal 
representative. 1996 
78-27-38. Comparative negl igence. 
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone 
bar recovery by that person. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defen-
dant or group of defendants whose fault, combined with the 
fault of persons immune from suit, exceeds the fault of the 
person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made 
under Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for 
any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to 
tha t defendant under Section 78-27-39. 
(4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault attributable 
to each defendant, the fact finder may, and when re-
quested by a party shall, consider the conduct of any 
person who contributed to the alleged injury regardless of 
whether the person is a person immune from suit or a 
defendant in the action and may allocate fault to each 
person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any 
person immune from suit who contributed to the alleged 
injury. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is 
considered only to accurately determine the fault of the 
person seeking recovery and a defendant and may not 
subject the person immune from suit to any liability, 
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
1994 
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages 
and proportion of fault. 
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by any party 
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts 
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person 
seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any person im-
mune from suit who contributed to the alleged injury. 
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault 
attributed to all persons immune from suit is less than 
40%, the trial court shall reduce that percentage or 
proportion of fault to zero and reallocate that percentage 
or proportion of fault to the other parties in proportion to 
the percentage or proportion of fault initially attributed to 
each party by the fact finder. After this reallocation, 
cumulative fault shall equal 100% with the persons im-
mune from suit being allocated no fault. 
(b) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault 
attributed to all persons immune from suit is 40% or 
more, tha t percentage or proportion of fault attributed to 
persons immune from suit may not be reduced under 
Subsection (2)(a). 
(c) (i) The jury may not be advised of the effect of any 
reallocation under Subsection (2). 
(ii) The jury may be advised that fault attributed 
to persons immune from suit may reduce the award of 
the person seeking recovery. 
(3) A person immune from suit may not be held liable, 
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
1994 
78-27-40. Amount of l iability l imited to proportion of 
fault — No contribution. 
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for 
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking 
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed 
to that defendant. 
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from any 
other person. 
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a 
civil action against any person immune from suit to recover 
damages resulting from the allocation of fault under Section 
78-27-38. 1994 
78-27-41. Jo inder of defendants. 
(1) A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a 
party to the litigation, may join as a defendant, in accordance 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any person other than 
a person immune from suit who may have caused or contrib-
uted to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for 
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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-8 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
nstruction and application. underpass; this act should be strictly construed 
$%he waiver of immunity from suit "for the to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it 
recovery of any property real or personal or for only as clearly expressed therein. Holt v. Utah 
Repossession thereof does not include an ac- State Rd. Comm., 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 
Son for damages for impairment of access to (1973). 
oroperty caused by construction of highway 
53-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent op-
eration of motor vehicles — Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury result-
ing from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other 
.equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employ-
ment, or under color of authority; provided, however, that this section shall 
not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while 
being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch. 
129, § 5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Admiralty jurisdiction: maritime 
nature of tort — modern cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 
105. 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, 
street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other 
structure located thereon. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Complaint, sufficiency of allegations. 
Construction. 
Contributory negligence. 
Dangerous objects. 
Discretionary function. 
Ice and snow on sidewalk. 
Manholes. 
Negligent construction. 
New duties not created. 
Nondelegable duty. 
Private developments. 
Traffic signs. 
Complaint, sufficiency of allegations. 
Claim for injuries "sustained on or about 
January 15, 1902, while walking on the side-
walk along First West street between Seventh 
and Eighth South, * * * through the negligence 
of the city in suffering * * * a fence * * * to be 
on said sidewalk/' not having misled the city, 
was sufficiently definite. Connor v. Salt Lake 
City, 28 Utah 248, 78 P. 479 (1904). 
Where plaintiff sustained damages to his au-
tomobile on city streets, and presented a claim 
for "necessary repairs to automobile $133," he 
cannot claim and recover additional damages 
for $1,000 for its "depreciation in value and 
525 
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63-30-10 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
pany. Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d Cited in Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 
763 (Utah 1987). 126 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. — AJLR. — State and local government liabil 
Comment, The Only Way to Manage a Desert: ity for injury or death of bicyclist due to defed 
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8 or obstruction m public bicycle path, 6$ 
J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987). A.L R.4th 204. 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights [Effective until July 1, 1990]. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury, 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander,, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by 
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, li-
cense, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it 
is negligent or intentional; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public dem-
onstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment 
of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any 
activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(1) arises out of the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous waste; or 
(iv) emergency evacuations; or 
(m) arises out of research or implementation of cloud management or 
seeding for the clearing of fog. 
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(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth 
amendment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the 
exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected rights. 
(b) If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are 
held invalid or unconstitutional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and 
governmental entities shall remain immune from suit for violations of 
fourth amendment rights. 
Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent 
act or omission of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights [Effective July 1, 1990]. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(a) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prose-
cution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, inter-
ference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights; 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection of any property; 
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative pro-
ceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(f) a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent 
or intentional; 
(g) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(h) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(k) any natural condition on state lands or as the result of any activity 
authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(1) the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous wastes; or 
(iv) emergency evacuations; or 
(m) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for 
the clearing of fog. 
(2) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth 
amendment rights under Chapter 16, Title 78, which is the exclusive 
remedy for injuries to those protected rights. 
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